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DISCOUNTS IN TRUST INVESTMENTS
DISCOUNTS IN TRUST INVESTMENTS
By JOSEPH FoieR:::
A TRUSTEE purchases a bond selling below par. Before maturity
L or call he sells the bond for more than the purchase price, or
at maturity or call he is paid par. Must he credit the gain to in-
come or to principal, and whichever the case, how and when shall
the credit be made available?'-
If the volume of litigation these questions have provoked is
an adequate criterion of their importance, one must conclude that
they have occupied the attention of writers2 to an extent dispro-
portionate to their significance. There is reason to believe, how-
ever, that for once at least academic concern is an accurate index
to practical consequence. Since bonds are often bought below
or above par, a great many trustees must frequently resolve these
or related issues. That the resolution is customarily made with
an insouciance springing from confidence in the habitual only
enhances the desirability of full discussion. If you catch a glimpse
of the beast, there is merit in crying wolf to the unwary. In addi-
*Member of the District of Columbia bar. .Formerly in Legal Division,
U. S. Treasury Department, now in Legal Division, National Labor Rela-
tions Board.
'If an intention on the subject is manifested in the trust instrument,
that, of course, will govern. Just when an intention is to be implied from
the use of particular language is itself something of a problem. See
(1936) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 448. Where securities are received from the
settlor, as distinguished from those purchased by the trustee, the income
beneficiary is held entitled to all the interest on bonds inventoried above
par, on the theory that such a course serves the settlor's intention. Boston
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Williams, (1935) 290 Mass. 385, 195 N. E.
393; Ballantine v. Young, (1908) 74 N. J. Eq. 572, 70 AtI. 668; aff'd on
other points in (1910) 76 N. J. Eq. 613, 75 Atl. 1100. But cf. In re Wells'
Estate, (1913) 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174. It seems clear, accordingly,
that where the bonds are inventoried below par the income beneficiary will
receive only the interest, and will not receive any part of the difference
between par and the inventory value.
-Edgerton, Premiums and Discounts in Trust Accounts, (1918) 31
Harv. L. Rev. 447; 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) sec. 830; Black,
Amortization-An Unsettled Question in Trust Accounting, (1932) 17 Mass.
L. Q. 81; Vierling, Amortization of Premiums and Accumulation of Dis-
counts on Trust Investments, (1923) 36 Trust Cos. 177; Vierling, Pros and
Cons in Regard to Amortization of Premiums and Accumulation of Dis-
counts on Trust Investments, (1923) Trust Cos. 489; Vierling, Accumula-
tion of Discounts, (1926) 11 St. Louis L. Rev. 266; Kinnear, The Admin-
istration of Trust Funds, (1936) 6 Fortnightly L. J. 87; Notes, (1927)
48 A. L. R. 684, 689; (1936) 101 A. L. R. 7; Developments in the Law,
Trusts-1934, (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1162, 1194, 1195; Note, (1935) 45
Yale L. J. 156; Note, (1936) 20 MiNNEsoTA LAw REviaw 203; (1933)
47 Harv. L. Rev. 143; (1936) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 448.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tion, recent developments in the bond market have produced new
wine, and it is doubtful that the old bottles will suffice.
I
There is a handful of cases in which the income beneficiary 3
has sought to obtain the gain, which will hereafter be referred to
as "discount." In every instance but one4 he has been unsuccess-
ful. He has been refused where he asked that the discount be
made available to him prior to realization in the form of periodic
installments.5 He has met with no greater success where he has
claimed the discount in a lump sum after it was realized.0 The
first type of refusal, of course, is not altogether conclusive. A
court might deny the life tenant the discount before realization, but
allow it to him afterwards. On the other hand, courts which deny
the life tenant the lump sum after realization necessarily hold that
he has no right to the discount at all. As it happens, most of the
cases have involved realized discounts, but the courts generally
have assumed that such a situation was identical with that in
which the discount had not yet been realized. Thus in In re
Houston's Will7 a life tenant objected to an accounting by trustees
which credited to principal a realized discount. Yet the court
said:
"The question which is presented for decision therefore is
whether or not, where trust funds are invested in bonds at a dis-
count, the discount is to be accumulated in favor of a life bene-
ficiary, rather than treated as an accretion to the principal in favor
of the remaindermen."
s
3The income beneficiary will hereafter be referred to as the "life ten-
ant," the remainder beneficiary as the "remainderman."4Re Armstrong, (1934) 55 Ont. L. Rep. 639.
5in re Gartenlaub's Estate, (1926) 198 Cal. 204, 244 Pac. 348, discussed
infra, note 6.6Townsend v. United States Trust Co., (N.Y. 1877) 3 Redf. Surr. 220
(semble); In re Houston's Will, (1933) 19 Del. Ch. 207, 165 Atl. 132;
Wood v. Davis, (1929) 168 Ga. 504, 148 S. E. 330; Old Colony Trust Co.
v. Comstock, (1935) 290 Mass. 377, 195 N. E. 389. Cf. In re Gerry, (1886)
103 N. Y. 445, 9 N. E. 235. In Gartenlaub's Estate, (1926) 198 Cal. 204,
244 Pac. 348 cited supra note 5, the life tenant asked to have the dis-
count periodically accumulated for his benefit. It is clear, however, that
he did not seek accumulation for future distribution, but wished to have
periodic credits to offset amortization of premiums for the remainderman's
benefit. The purpose of the action, therefore, was to have released peri-
odically that portion of the interest paid by the debtor which would other-
wise be held to compensate corpus for the premiums in accordance with
the holding of In re Gartenlaub's Estate, (1921) 185 Cal. 648, 198 Pac. 209.
The court's holding, therefore, was a refusal to compel the trustee to
make the discount available in periodic installments prior to realization.
7(1933) 19 Del. Ch. 207, 165 Atl. 132.8(1933) 19 Del. Ch. 207, 208, 165 Atl. 132, 133. Italics added.
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Now a trustee may purchase a bond at a price above par and
subsequently liquidate it at less than the purchase price. If the
discount authority is accepted, it is only logical to conclude that in
this situation the premium should be paid out of principal rather
than income.9 If income is not to get the advantage of a discount,
it should not be burdened with a premium; if corpus is inflated by
discounts, it should be deflated by premiums. However, while
some courts have charged principal with the premium,' 0 the present
trend and majority view are to the effect that corpus should be re-
imbursed out of income for the premium," reimbursement being
customarily accomplished by withholding part of each interest
coupon and crediting the withheld sum to principal. 2
The usual rationalization for the majority premium view is that
in order to preserve corpus it is essential that the life tenant should
receive only the true income yield, and that in business understand-
ing the interest payable on premium bonds is in part income, in
part a return of principal.'" This reasoning may be sound enough,
gThe purchaser of a bond customarily pays, in addition to the quoted
price, an amount representing accumulated interest, which must be restored
to principal on collection of the first interest payment. Hemenway v.
Hemenway, (1883) 134 Mass. 446; 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935)
2434. The premium referred to herein, however, is the payment of an
amount above par without reference to any payment on account of ac-
cumulated interest.
-oWhitridge v. Williams, (1889) 71 Md. 105, 17 At. 938; In re Penn-
Gaskell's Estate, (1904) 208 Pa. St. 346, 57 At. 715; Hite's Devisees v.
Hite's Executor, (1892) 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778. On the English view,
which is in accord, see Edgerton, Premiums and Discounts in Trust Ac-
counts, (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 447, 448, n. 2.
"Curtis v. Osborn, (1907) 79 Conn. 555, 65 Atl. 968; In re Garten-
laub's Estate, (1921) 185 Cal. 648, 198 Pac. 209; Ballantine v. Young,(1908) 74 N. J. Eq. 572, 70 Atl. 668, aff'd on other points in (1910) 76
N. J. Eq. 613, 75 Atl. 1100; New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Baker,(1901) 165 N. Y. 484, 59 N. E. 257; In re Stevens, (1907) 187 N. Y.
471, 80 N. E. 358; Dexter v.-Watson, (1907) 54 Misc. Rep. 484, 106 N. Y.
S. 80; In re Brewster's Estate, (1937) 163 Misc. Rep. 820, 298 N. Y. S. 761;
Gould v. Gould, (1925) 126 Misc. Rep. 54, 213 N. Y. S. 286; New England
Trust Co. v. Eaton, (1886) 140 Mass. 532, 4 N. E. 69; Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Comstock, (1935) 290 Mass. 377, 195 N. E. 389; In re Allis' Estate,(1904) 123 Wis. 223, 101 N. W. 365; In re Wells' Estate, (1913) 156 Wis.
294, 144 N. W. 174.
12On the methods of amortization see Vierling, Amortization of Pre-
miums and Accumulation of Discounts on Trust Investments, (1923) 36
Trust Cos. 177; Edgerton, Premiums and Discounts in Trust Accounts,(1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 447, 455 et seq.; 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees(1935) sec. 831, pp. 2433, 2434. As to whether amortization should be till
call or to maturity cf. Old Colony Trust v. Comstock, (1935) 290 Mass.
377, 195 N. E. 389, with In re Brewster's Estate, (1937) 163 Misc Rep.
820, 298 N. Y. S. 761.
"sIn re Gartenlaub's Estate, (1921) 185 Cal. 648, 652, 198 Pac. 209,
210. 211; Ballantine v. Young, (1908) 74 N. 3. Eq. 572, 574, 575, 70 At.
668, 669, aff'd on other points in (1910) 76 N. J. Eq. 613, 75 Atl. 1100;
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but it cuts two ways. If the true income yield of premium pur-
chases is to be calculated by taking into account the price paid,
why should not the yield of discount purchases be similarly cal-
culated ?
If the interest paid on a premium investment represents in part
principal, why does not the face amount of a discount investment
represent in part income? If it is necessary to preserve corpus by
limiting the life tenant to the true income yield, is it not equally
necessary to preserve income by allowing it at least the true in-
come. yield?
Despite the apparent inconsistency between the discount and
majority premium views, the discount authority has been estab-
lished in the very jurisdictions which apply the majority premium
rule. What is more, both rules have been applied to the same
trust. Thus in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comstock,14 the Massa-
chusetts court held, as to the same trust, that (1) premiums must
be amortized for the remainderman's benefit; (2) realized dis-
counts may not be paid to the life tenant. In 1921, the California
court held that premiums should be amortized,1" but five years
later, in connection with the same trust, it held that discounts
ought not to be accumulated as set-offs against amortizations of
premiums. 6
The cases which first established the discount rule were de-
cided before the premium doctrine had crystallized, and their
logic was simple to the point of naivet6: the remainderman had
always been held entitled to profits realized on a purchase and
sale, and here was a purchase and a sale and a profit.'7 After the
development of the majority premium rule, however, the courts,
with one exception,"s felt compelled to justify the discount rule
on other bases.
The principal justifications are three in number. First, it is
pointed out that the discount is not realized until the bond is sold
New England Trust Co. v. Eaton, (1886) 140 Mass. 532, 536, 4 N. E. 69,
71, 72; In re Stevens, (1907) 187 N. Y. 471, 476, 477, 80 N. E. 358, 359;
In re Allis' Estate, (1904) 123 Wis. 223, 231, 232, 101 N. W. 365, 368;
In re Wells' Estate, (1913) 156 Wis. 294, 309, 310, 144 N. W. 174; 179,
180; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comstock, (1935) 290 Mass. 377, 380, 195
N. E. 389, 391.
14(1935) 290 Mass. 377, 195 N. E. 389.
"5In re Gartenlaub's Estate, (1921) 185 Cal. 648, 198 Pac. 209.
1In re Gartenlaub's Estate, (1926) 198 Cal. 204, 244 Pac. 348, dis-
cussed supra, note 6.
'
7 Townsend v. United States Trust Co., (N.Y. 1877) 3 Redf. Surr.
220 (semble). Cf. In re Gerry, (1886) 103 N. Y. 445, 9 N. E. 235.
18(1929) Wood v. Davis, 168 Ga. 504, 148 S. E. 330.
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or paid. Hence, it is said, if the discount is paid to the life tenant
in installments during the life of the bond, the remainderman is
subjected to an extraordinary risk, since in the event of dishonor
or a sale at a price below the purchase price, he loses not only
all or part of the amount paid for the bond but also the amount
paid to the life tenant; that he may lose the first sum is a risk
he customarily runs, but that he should run the risk of losing the
second sum is a hazard beyond common experience. 19
Assuming, for the present only and generously enough, that
this argument is sound so far as it goes, obviously it does not go
far enough. At most it is a reason for not paying the life tenant
the discount before it is realized, but it cannot conceivably be a
valid reason for refusing him the discount after it has been real-
ized. There is no sense in protecting corpus against the poten-
tial dishonor of a paid security. But so comes home to roost the
fallacy in approach already pointed out, that is, the assumption by
the courts that disposition of a discount after realization must be
identical with disposition before realization.
The second principal argument advanced for refusing the life
tenant the benefit of the discount has been that bonds sell below
par not only on account of the comparatively low interest rate,
but very frequently because of factors of risk, speculation, market
whims, etc., all of which normally run to the benefit or detriment
of corpus . 2  Any informed person will freely concede that a dis-
count does not necessarily reflect a comparatively low interest rate,
but once the concession is made, how is it pertinent? The rule
that premiums must be amortized is not traditionally supported
by the contention that the premium reflects a comparatively high
interest rate. If it were, the contention that price depends only
on interest rate would be just as erroneous as when advanced in
connection with a below-par instead of above-par security. The
rationale of the premium cases has been that of "true yield,"
and on this score the cause of the price is irrelevant. For the
setting up of this man of straw Mr. Justice Holmes is perhaps
chiefly to blame. He assumed that th6 only possible rationale for
compensating corpus for premiums was a theory that a premium
191n re Gartenlaub's Estate, (1926) 198 Cal. 204, 214, 215, 244 Pac.
348, 352; In re Houston's Will, (1933) 19 Del. Ch. 207, 212, 213, 165
Ati. 132, 134; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comstock, (1935) 290 Mass. 377,
382, 383, 195 N. E. 389, 392.
201n re Gartenlaub's Estate, (1926) 198 Cal. 204, 209, 210, 211, 244
Pac. 348, 350; In re Houston's Will, (1933) 19 Del. Ch. 207, 211, 212,
165 AtI. 132. 134, 135: Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comstock, (1935) 290
Mass. 377, 383, 384, 195 N. E. 389, 392, 393.
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was caused only by a relatively high interest rate, and refused to
adopt the obvious fiction. 21  But the assumption is, of course,
unwarranted. The justification for amortizing premiums or ac-
cumulating discounts is that in an economic and business sense the
true yield of a security is ascertainable by reference to both the
price and the contract rate of interest, and not by reference to the
latter factor alone.
The third argument has been that a system of accumulating
discounts would encounter various practical difficulties. 22  Just
what these difficulties may be has not been enunciated otherwise
than vaguely, although half-hearted references have been made to
possible complications in case the bond is sold or the life tenant
dies before redemption. But any such troublesome contingencies
are also inherent in the premium situation, if, as the authorities
seem to indicate, the periodic crediting to principal of the with-
held portion of the coupons is final, not conditional. Moreover,
this argument has been made even when the discount had already
been realized, so that again the courts have indulged in a solicitude
to avoid what can no longer occur.
The Restatement of Trusts adopts the prevailing rules as to
premiums and discounts, subject to some qualifications. 2- The
Uniform Principal and Income Act,24 however, has adopted the
rule intended best to promote expedient trust administration,25
that is, the minority rule to the effect that premiums are not to
be amortized and discounts are not to be accumulated. Still an-
other doctrine was proposed by Mr. Justice Holmes, who urged
that no fixed rule should be applied, but that the matter should
be left to the discretion of each individual trustee, subject to
court review of his accounting to insure his having used "reason-
2lHemenway v. Hemenway, (1883) 134 Mass. 446; dissenting in New
England Trust Co. v. Eaton, (1886) 140 Mass. 532, 544, 4 N. E. 69, 77.22 1n re Gartenlaub's Estate, (1926) 198 Cal. 204, 215, 244 Pac. 348,
352; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comstock, (1935) 290 Mass. 377, 384, 195
N. E. 389, 393.22Section 239, Comment f; Section 240, Comment h.
24Section 6 of the Act pro 'ides: "Where any part of the principal con-
sists of bonds or other obligations for the payment of money, they shall
be deemed principal at their inventory value or in default thereof at their
market value at the time the principal was established, or at their cost
where purchased later, regardless of their par or maturity value; and upon
their respective maturities or upon their sale any loss or gain realized
thereon shall fall upon or enure to the principal." Cf. Oregon, Code (1935
Supp.) secs. 63-1201 ff.; Hawaii, Rev. L. (1935) sec. 4714.
25See Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and Proceedings (1931) 327; (1936) 34 Mich. L.
Rev. 448, 451, n. 12.
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able care to hold the balance even between opposing interests."26
Finally, it has been suggested that as a discount may in part re-
flect a low interest rate, in part other factors, the life tenant should
be allowed the prevailing investment yield, and the remainderman
should be allowed the balance.27 It would follow that in a pre-
mium case the life tenant should be charged with a sufficient
amount of the premium to bring the income yield down to the pre-
vailing yield, and the remainderman should bear the balance. Under
this system, if the prevailing yield is 4 per cent and a 20-year 3
per cent bond is bought at 65, $20 of the discount will be allocated
to income, $15 to principal. If the prevailing yield is 4 per cent
and a 5 per cent 20-year bond is bought at 130, $20 of the premium
and no more will be amortized out of coupons.
As is so often the case, the reasoned adoption of any one of
the several possible rules will depend primarily on the funda-
mental approach of the person who must choose between the
alternatives. In this instance there is simply a choice between
the postulates with which one may begin. If the approach, is
from the viewpoint of a trustee anxious to promote a facile admin-
istration of the trust, the best rule may seem to be that of the
Uniform Act, namely, neither to amortize premiums nor to ac-
cumulate discounts. This rule is the simplest and saves account-
ing expenses, and under it a trustee can still adjust the equities
to some extent by striking a rough balance between premium and
discount purchases. If the approach is that one should merely
apply logically the general rule that the life tenant is entitled to
economic income, the remainderman to economic principal, the
rule to apply is that of amortizing premiums and accumulating
discounts. As has been most ably pointed out,28 a discount is not
a capital gain but an "income" gain, although the difference be-
20Cases cited in note 21, supra. The rule is not altogether without
other support. Cf. In re Houston's Will, (1933) 19 Del. Ch. 207, 165 Ati.
132. Furthermore, in most cases the courts have merely approved the
action of a trustee in amortizing premiums or in refraining from accumu-
lating discounts. But cf. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Baker,
(1901) 165 N. Y. 484, 59 N. E. 257, charging the account of a trustee who
had failed to amortize premiums.
27(1933) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 143; Developments in the Law, Trusts-
1934, (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1162, 1194, 1195.
2SBlack, Amortization-An Unsettled Question in Trust Accounting,
(1932) 17 Mass. L. 0. 81, 84; Edgerton, Premiums and Discounts in Trust
Accounts, (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 447, 460, 461, and see also at 451,
452; Vierling, Pros and Cons in Regard to Amortization of Premiums
and Accumulation of Discounts on Trust Investments, (1923) 36 Trust Cos.
489, 493; Vierling, Amortization of Premiums and Accumulation of Dis-
counts on Trust Investments. (1923) 36 Trust Cos. 177, 180.
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tween such a gain and that accomplished by the mere selling of an
asset at a better price than cost has not always been perceived.2
The distinction is, of course, that in a discount purchase the future
appreclation is inherent in the investment at the time it is made;
it is calculable at the time of purchase. In a sense, it is a con-
tracted gain.
The approach to the problem may be from the viewpoint of
one anxious to maintain a sort of equitable status quo. Such an
approach may result in a deliberate abandonment of strict theory
and the adoption of the rule allowing the life tenant no less and
no more than the prevailing interest yield.
The only rules which lack justification no matter what the
approach are those now applied in most states, and those urged
by Mr. Justice Holmes. To amortize premiums without accumu-
lating discounts has no basis in either administrative convenience
or theory, and results in gross injustice to the life tenant. Mr.
Justice Holmes' rule of discretion, advocated because of a mis-
taken notion of the basis for amortizing premiums, is unsound be-
cause in almost all cases the trustee will have no relevant facts
to influence the discretion he is supposed to exercise. He will
have to make his choice on the basis of approach, rather than on
the basis of factual circumstances. He will therefore have to do
what the courts should do-choose a rule of law, and there is no
reason to govern his choice by a fictitious standard of impartiality.
There cannot be much hope that the courts which now apply
the prevailing rules will change them by the decisional process, or
even that other courts will arrive at other results. A change in
the prevailing authority would involve the possible surcharging
of thousands of trustees who in good faith and in reliance on
court decisions for years have amortized premiums without ac-
cumulating discounts. However, a change may, of course, be
accomplished by legislation, possibly by widespread adoption of
the Uniform Act.
There is, however, one application of the majority rules which
is not yet so fixed that it may not be open to reconsideration. A
bond may be bought at a premium and subsequently sold at an
even higher premium or at a loss smaller in amount than the sink-
ing fund. It has been indicated that in this event the remainder-
man should be credited not only with the gain made from the sale
29See cases cited supra note 17. A Canadian commentator has fallen
into the same error. Kinnear, The Administration of Trust Funds, (1936)
6 Fortnightly L. J. 87.
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(to which he is clearly entitled), but also with the whole of the
sinking fund built up during the time the bond was held.30 The
justification for this rule is that the approach of maturity has an
inevitable tendency to force premiums down toward par. Hence,
the maintenance or increase in price must have been caused by
economic changes of which principal is the traditional beneficiary;
and "that the remainderman has gained on the sale because of
accidental reasons to the benefit of which he is entitled should not
prevent him from recouping from the life cestui a loss actually
suffered due to the wasting of the bond." 3'
It would appear, however, that a reexamination of the situa-
tion is in order. It is true, of course, that in the long run the
passage of time will force down premiums. But this does not
mean that in the absence of other changes in circumstances a pre-
mium will consistently drop as the bond approaches maturity. The
passage of time alone, even of a number of years, will frequently
have the effect of forcing the premium up rather than down. If
the bond is bought and sold during one of these periods, the gain
is partly or wholly due to the lapse of time. In such a case it is
unfair to income to allot to corpus a fund built up to protect it
against an expected attrition of time which has not materialized.
The passage of time has caused a gain, not a wasting.
The reason why premiums may within certain periods increase
with the passage of time is clear. It is a truism that as bonds
approach maturity their net yield tends to drop because- of the
attractiveness of the increased liquidity inherent in the shorter
term of the investment. Although the yield grows less as time
advances, nevertheless the price of a bond bought at a premium
will tend to fall, though not at so rapid a rate as would be the
case if the factor of increasing liquidity were absent. Betveen
certain periods, however, the pull of the liquidity factor may
OIn re Wells' Estate, (1913) 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174; see New
England Trust Co. v. Eaton, (1886) 140 Mass. 532, 537-539, 9 N. E. 69,
72-74.
314 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) sec. 831, p. 2433. The cases
cited supra, note 30, have reasoned that corpus is entitled to the gain be-
cause it would have borne any loss in case of a sale at a price below that
of purchase. If this language be taken literally, obviously it has no bear-
ing on the question of what disposition should be made of the sinking fund,
not of the gain on the sale. If what is meant is that corpus should get the
sinking fund despite sale at a price above purchase price because the sale
might have been at a price so far below purchase price that the sinking
fund would not compensate for the entire loss, the argument is unsound.
The possibility of gain on a sale is balanced by the possibility of loss
without reference to the sinking fund.
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be so great that the yield will fall steeply, and so much so that
the price, a function of the yield, may tend to go up during those
periods rather than down. An illustration of the operation of
this process may be found by glancing at the quotations on gov-
ernment bonds. At the present writing two issues of three per
cent Treasury bonds are quoted on the New York bond market.
The bonds of both issues are identical in every respect, with the
exception that those of one issue are callable in 1946 and mature
in 1948, while the others are callable in 1951 and mature in 1955.
If it is a correct assumption that the passage of time inevitably
forces premiums down in the absence of changing economic con-
ditions, it follows that on the same day the 1946-48 bonds will
sell at less of a premium than the 1951-55 bonds. But it is the
contrary that is true. Thus on April 18, 1939, the 1946-48 bonds
sold at 110.14 (dollars and thirty-seconds), whereas the 1951-55
bonds sold at 109.24. On April 20, 1939, there was trading on
the New York exchange in five issues of Treasury 2 3 4's, each issue
being identical with the others except for differences in redemp-
tion and maturity dates. The following table of prices on April
20 shows that the issues with the earlier redemption and maturity
dates sold at a higher premium than the issues with the later
redemption and maturity dates (prices in dollars and thirty-sec-
onds, high and low quotations through April 20):
Issue Price High for 1939 Low for 1939
1945-47 ................ 108.22 109 107
1948-51 ................ 108 108.7 105.19
1951-54 ----------- 106.25 106.28 104
1956-59 ................ 106 6 106.6 103.4
1960-65 ................ 105.2 105.3 102.20
On the same date, too, the two earliest maturing issues of
Treasury 23 4's sold at a higher price than an issue of Treasury
23/s's, which is callable in 1955 and matures in 1960, the 2y's
dosing at 107.8. The high for 1939 through April 20 for this
issue was 107.11 and the low was 104.12.
The European waT has, of course, had a considerable influence
on the prices of government bonds. The following table of the
closing prices for selected issues of Treasury bonds on October
6, 1939, illustrates that the change in market conditions has not
reversed the principle that operated" in April. (Prices in dollars
and thirty-seconds.)
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Issue Price
2 3/4's, 194547 -------------------------------------- 104.23
2 3/4's, 1948-51 -------------------------------------- 103.6
2 3/4's, 1951-54 -------------------------------------- 101.20
2 3/4's, 1956-59 .......................................... 100 24
2 34's, 1958-63 .......................................... 100.23
2 3 4's, 1960-65 -------------------------------------- 100.24
2 7/s's, 1955-60 -------------------------------------- 101.22
3's, 1951-55 .............................................. 104.4
II
Up to now the discussion has been concerned with securities
paying interest at periodic intervals, and necessarily the threshing
has been largely of old straw. There are, however, no authorities
and no writings dealing with what might be called "pure dis-
count" securities; that is, securities on which the creditor does not
undertake to pay interest periodically, but which are offered for
purchase on original issue at a price below maturity value.
Until recently, there has been no need for trustees to be over-
ly concerned with the disposition of the discount on such securi-
ties. As most of these are short term obligations, they probably
have not been purchased in any considerable volume by trusts,
and when purchased, it has no doubt been assumed that the dis-
count belonged to income, as otherwise the investment would
yield no income at all. Furthermore, in view of the extremely
short term of the investment, there was no difficulty in waiting
till liquidation before making the discount available to income.
In the last few years, however, the availability of United States
Savings Bonds has greatly increased the amount of "pure dis-
count" securities held in trust, and the fact that these bonds have
a ten-year term gives rise to a definite problem.
United States Savings Bonds are issued under the act ol
February 4, 1935,32 which authorizes the secretary of the treasury
with the approval of the president, to issue such bonds from time
to time on a discount basis only, to mature not less than ten nor
more than twenty years from date of issue. The secretary of the
treasury is empowered to prescribe terms for redemption before
maturity, and the issue price and terms of redemption must be
such as to afford an investment yield not in excess of three per
cent compounded semiannually. It is provided that "it shall not
be lawful for any one person at any one time to hold Savings Bonds
8249 Stat. at L. 21, 31 U. S. C. A. sec. 757c.
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issued during any one calendar year in an aggregate amount ex-
ceeding $10,000 (maturity value)."33
Savings bonds are issued only in certain authorized registered
forms, including registration in trust. The bonds are payable at or
after maturity at full value, or, at the option of the owner, may
be redeemed at any time prior to maturity (but not within 60
days after the issue date) at the redemption value of the bond as
of that time. They may not be the subject of a voluntary transfer,
but are not exempted from creditors' remedies. Savings bonds
may be purchased for cash at post offices of the first, second, and
third classes, and at selected post offices of the fourth class, and
may also be purchased by mail upon application to the treasurer
of the United States or to any Federal Reserve bank. The bonds
3 3Under the regulations of the Treasury Department the savings bond
holdings of a trust are chargeable to the beneficiaries having "present in-
terests." A trust with more than one beneficiary may be able, therefore,
to hold more than $10,000 (maturity value) of savings bonds issued dur-
in any one calendar year. On the other hand, if a beneficiary with a pres-
ent interest has individual holdings, the amount which can be held by
the trust will thereby be diminished, with the result that a trust with one
beneficiary may not be able to hold the full $10,000. Even if there is more
than one beneficiary with a present interest, if one of them holds in his in-
dividual right $10,000 of savings bonds issued in one calendar year, the
trust will be unable to hold any more savings bonds issued during the
same year. Section III-1 of Treasury Department Circular No. 530, 2d
Revision, Dec. 15, 1938 (regulations governing United States Savings
Bonds), Federal Register Dec. 23, 1938, p. 3128, sets forth that in deter-
mining holdings for the purpose of the limitation on holdings, "there must
be taken into account the aggregate present interest of that person in the
maturity value of all savings bonds issued during any one calendar year,
as shown by the issue dates thereon, including, but not limited to: (a) The
entire maturity value of (1) bonds registered in the name of that person
and (2) those registered in his name with another named as co-owner,
and (b) The extent of his present interest in (1) those held for his benefit
by a fiduciary . . . and (2) those in which he has acquired a present
interest because of the death of another or on the happening of any other
event. Bonds of which the person is merely the designated beneficiary in
case of the death of the owner, bonds which are held by him in a fiduciary
capacity only, or bonds in which he has only a future beneficial interest
need not be included." Section 111-2 of the same circular sets out the
method by which a beneficiary's present interest in trust holdings may be
computed, as follows: "The extent of a person's present interest in bonds
held in trust is deemed to be determined by his relative share of the in-
come from the trust, whether such share is payable periodically or is to be
accumulated for future distribution, and may be calculated in accordance
with the following general rules: (a) If his share does not exceed a
certain fractional part of the entire income from the trust, he will be
charged only with a corresponding fractional interest in the bonds; (b) If
he is entitled to the entire income from the trust, or if he is entitled to a
stipulated sum or other share which may exceed any definite fractional part
of the entire income, he must be charged with the entire interest in the
bonds. Where the identity of the beneficiaries of a trust cannot be pres-
ently determined, or where the trust is charitable in nature with indefinite
beneficiaries, $10,000 (maturity value), but no more, of bonds issued dur-
ing any one calendar year may be held for the trust."
DISCOUNTS IN TRUST INVESTMENTS
are issued in denominations (representing maturity values) of $25,
$50, $100, $500, and $1,000, for which the corresponding purchase
prices are, respectively, $18.75, $37.50, $75, $375, and $750. The
bonds are dated as of the first day of the month in which the pur-
chase price is received, and mature ten years after such issue date.
No periodic interest is paid, and, as can be seen from the above
figures, if a bond is held till maturity it affords an investment yield
of about 2.9 per cent per annum compounded semiannually. The
bond increases in redemption value at stated intervals, but not in
regular amounts, so that a bond cashed before maturity yields a
smaller percentage return than a bond cashed at maturity. The
redemption values are shown in the following table:
MATURITY VALUE..$25.00
ISSUE PRICE .......... $18.75
Period after issue date F
First year ........................ $18.75
1 to 1/ years ................ 19.00
1 2 to 2 years ........ 19.25
2 to 2% years ........ 19.50
2Y2 to 3 years ................ 19.75
3 to 3% years ........ 20.00
3VY to 4 years ........ 20.25
4 to 4% years ................ 20.50
4y2 to 5 years ................ 20.75
5 to 5% years ........ 21.00
5% to 6 years ........ 21.25
6 to 6 A years ................ 21.50
6% to 7 years ........ 21.75
7 to 7r years ................ 22.00
7Y2 to 8 years ........ 22.50
8 to 8 years ................ 23.00
8V2 to 9 years ................ 23.50
9 to 9 /2 years ................ 24.00
9y2 to 10 years .............. 24.50
AT MATURITY ........ $25.00
$50.00 $100 $500 $1,000
$37.50 $75 $375 $750
edemption values during each period
$37.50 $ 75.00 $375.00 $ 750.00
38.00 76.00 380.00 760.00
38.50 77.00 385.00 770.00
39.00 78.00 390.00 780.00
39.50 79.00 395.00 790.00
40.00 80.00 400.00 800.00
40.50 81.00 405.00 810.00
41.00 82.00 410.00 820.00
41.50 83.00 415.00 830.00
42.00 84.00 420.00 840.00
42.50 85.00 425.00 850.00
43.00 86.00 430.00 860.00
43.50 87.00 435.00 870.00
44.00 88.00 440.00 880.00
45.00 90.00 450.00 900.00
46 00 92.00 460.00 920.00
47.00 94.00 470.00 940.00
48.00 96.00 480.00 960.00
49.00 98.00 490.00 980.00
$50.00 $100.00 $500.00 $1,000.0034
This brief description of savings bonds shows certain features
which make them attractive trust investments. If they are held
till maturity, their return is greater than is now obtainable on other
federal securities. Whenever necessary they may be cashed with-
out loss of principal, and, after the first year, for an amount higher
than the purchase price. Since trustees are not permitted to specu-
late, and must have as one of their primary purposes the mainte-
nance of corpus intact, the advantage that the bonds cannot
34The substance of this paragraph is derived from Treasury Depart-
ment circular No. 530, Second Revision, Dec. 15, 1938 (regulations goverm-
ing United States Savings Bonds), and Treasury Department Circular No.
596, Dec. 15, 1938 (offer of -United States Savings Bonds, Series D), Fed-
eral Register (Dec. 23, 1938) p. 3135.
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fluctuate downward more than offsets the disadvantage that they
cannot fluctuate upward beyond the fixed return.
It is not surprising, therefore, that a considerable amount of
trust monies have been invested in savings bonds. No statistics
are available as to the amount purchased by trustees alone, but the
amount purchased by all fiduciaries (including trustees, guardians,
executors, etc.) is known. From March 1, 1935 (the first issue
date), through July, 1939, $172,981,600 (maturity value) of sav-
ings bonds have been registered in a fiduciary form, representing
a total purchase price of $129,736,200.3 5
Despite the prevailing authority to the effect that discounts on
securities paying interest periodically do not inure to the life
tenant's benefit, it is clear that discounts on "pure discount" securi-
ties must be regarded as income, as they are obviously in lieu of
interest, and as there is no other income from the investment. It
is true, however, that the courts of jurisdictions which may adopt
the Uniform Principal and Income Act will have to stretch the
literal terms of the act to arrive at this result, as the section dealing
with the disposition of discounts does not differentiate between
"pure discount" and other securities.3 6
But if the accrual in value must belong, then, to the life tenant,
how are the bonds to be administered for trusts in which no part
of the income is to be accumulated, in view of the fact that the
accrual is not realized until the bonds are cashed? There are
several alternatives possible. First, the income represented by
the accruing interest may be withheld and paid to the life tenant
when realized at redemption. Such a procedure, however, would
obviously be a breach of the duty owed to the life tenant, for he is
entitled not merely to income but also to a steady flow of income.
3 7
The alternative, of course, is to pay the life tenant the interest ac-
cruing on the bond periodically, obtaining funds for the purpose
by using uninvested cash, by borrowing, or by liquidating part
of corpus, as by redeeming a savings bond of low denomination
or selling another principal asset. In the one decision which
held that the life tenant was entitled to the discount on bonds pay-
ing interest periodically, the court ruled that the discount should
be paid out of uninvested capital. If there was no such capital, said
the court, the trustees should not have invested in discount securi-
35The statistics have been obtained from the Division of Savings Bonds.
United States Treasury Department.
36See note 24, supra.37Re Armstrong. (1934) 55 Ont. L. Rep. 639, 641, 642: Restatement.
Trusts (1935) sec. 227:-3 B1ogert. Trusts and Trustees (1935) sec. 612.
p. 1943: cf. Graves v. Graves, (1934) 115 N. J. Eq. 547, 171 Ati. 681. 684.
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ties as they would be unable to make good the loss to the life
tenant.3s On the other hand, as we have already seen, the courts
which denied the life tenant the discount on bonds paying interest
periodically gave as one of their reasons the unavailability of a
fund out of which to pay the life tenant. If the life tenant were
paid out of capital before the discount was realized, then, said the
courts, the remainderman would be subjected to the risk of los-
ing, in case of dishonor, the amount paid out as well as the
principal."
It is clear, however, that the reason given for not making
payment to the life tenant periodically, whether out of uninvested
or invested capital, is without foundation, both as applied to
"pure discount" and other bonds. Whatever additional risk of
dishonor is created for the remainderman as to the discount secur-
ity is offset by the fact that there is no longer any risk of dishonor
of the capital which has been paid out. What has really happened
has been that principal has changed its form from, on the one hand,
a savings bond plus another capital asset into a savings bond plus
accumulated interest on that bond. The amount of capital remains
the same, and consequently the same amount as before, and no
more, is subject to possible dishonor. Taking the viewpoint that
principal is an amount, not a res, the principal in unchanged.
Taking the viewpoint that principal is a res, then the nature of
the res has been changed, as it always is in a change of invest-
ments, but without detriment to the remainderman.40
It is true that there may be other objections to paying the life
tenant the discount in installments prior to realization in the case
of a security whose price fluctuates. As the life tenant is paid
each installment, the book value of the bond is, of course, written
up a corresponding amount. However, the write-up will be ascrib-
ing a fictitious increase if the value of the bond has not risen
on the market to a corresponding extent. So long as the fund
being accumulated to equal the discount is not paid out, but is
only credited to income conditionally, this objection is of no con-
sequence. For that matter, if premium amortizations are to be
credited to principal unconditionally, thereby ascribing to a pre-
mium bond a possibly fictitious decrease in value, there is no reason
why the discount fund should not be either paid out or credited
finally. Furthermore, if an unconditional write-up does not cor-
BSRe Armstrong, (1934) 55 Ont. L. Rep. 639.
89See note 19, supra. Cf. Restatement, Trusts (1935), sec. 240, Com-
ment h; sec. 233, Comment d.
'
0 See Isaacs, Principal-Quantum or Res?, (1933) 28 Ilarv. L. Rev.
725.
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respond with the market the effect is merely to subject the re-
mainderman to any loss (as he is subject to any gain) caused by
market fluctuations-a result entirely justifiable. In the case of
bonds which pay interest periodically, there is also the danger
that the coupons may be dishonored, in which case the trustee
will be pretty much at a loss as to how to proceed. On the whole,
however, none of the possibilities mentioned appear sufficiently
consequential to offset the desirability of fair treatment for the
life tenant, especially if the premium rule is to stand unchanged.
In any event, they are not applicable to savings bonds, which have
no coupons and do not fluctuate in value except as they become
more valuable through the regular accruals in value, and which,
being redeemable at the holder's option, are equivalent at any
given date to cash.
Assuming, accordingly, that the trustee should be able to make
distribution to the life tenant periodically either out of idle funds
or by liquidating invested capital, it follows that the trustee should
be permitted to purchase savings bonds even when no income is to
be accumulated. The next question is, how much shall the life
tenant be paid at each period?
The most scientific method of accumulation when a bond has
been bought at a discount has been described by others.41 Briefly,
this consists of determining the interest rate which the bond will
earn from a table of bond values, and crediting income with the
difference between the amount so found due and the coupon rate.
The book value of principal is written up in an equal amount.
For the second interest period, the interest rate which the bond
will earn is reckoned on the increased principal. In the case of
savings bonds, however, the value of the bonds at any given time
is already known, and the discount should be accumulated therefore
in accordance with the known periodic increments. The book
value will thus be written up in terms of actual value, and not in
terms of a theoretical value. If the bond is then redeemed before
maturity there is no need for adjustments, and at any given time
the book value of principal reflects the immediate redemption value
of the bond. Where then no income is to be accumulated under
the terms of the trust, the life tenant should be paid periodically
an amount equal to the accrual in redemption value of the savings
bonds during the income period.
4 lEdgerton, Premiums and Discounts in Trust Accounts, (1918) 31
Harv. L. Rev. 447, 467; Vierling, Amortization of Premiums and Accu-
mulation of Discounts on Trust Investments, (1923) 36 Trust Cos. 177,
184, 185.
